ABSTRACT Fault tree generation technology is a key issue for safety analysis of large complex systems. Traditional safety analysis methods usually describe the origin, propagation, or concrete behavior of the fault and do not portray the constraints between faults. However, these constraints are the system's characteristics, and a lack of expression of these constraints will make the fault model defective, thereby resulting in a fault tree that will reduce the accuracy of the safety analysis. To improve the efficiency and accuracy of safety analysis, this paper proposes a fault tree generation method that is based on fault configuration and introduces the variability management of software product lines to model system faults and perform the formal analysis. First, the fault feature diagram is defined to describe the constraint relationships between system faults, and the fault-labeled transition system is defined based on the Kripke structure to describe the system behavior. Then, based on the model semantics, the procedure for generating fault trees by model checking is established. Finally, using temporal logic to describe the system safety attributes, we adopt the model checking tool SNIP to verify the safety attributes and generate the fault tree automatically. The fault modeling method that is proposed in this paper includes the inherent constraints between faults, which makes the system fault model more realistic and accurate. A case study demonstrates the effectiveness of the proposed method.
I. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
System safety analysis [1] is the core element of system safety engineering. The main objective is to study the system behavior when various system components are in abnormal working states due to faults. System safety analysis is also the basis for safety assessment; its major purpose is to understand and identify hazards in the system to ensure that the system meets the specified safety requirements.
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) [2] is one of the most common safety analysis techniques; it involves qualitative and quantitative analyses of system failures based on top-down deduction. The fault tree, which is the basis for analysis, is represented in the form of a tree-like logic diagram, with the specified events, logic gates and other symbols depicting the logical relationships between the basic events, which occur due to the failures of the system. The traditional fault tree generation procedure usually requires the safety engineer to analyze the causes according to specified system failure events and obtain all possible reasons for the system failure by iteration. The result is represented as a fault tree. Therefore, the quality of the fault tree depends on the safety engineer's personal skills and experience. This also makes the fault tree generation procedure error-prone and time-consuming [3] .
With the increasing scale and complexity of the system, traditional safety analysis methods face enormous challenges [4] . Determining how to improve the analysis process, reduce the cost and promote the quality of the analysis has become a research focus in the field. In recent years, the A proposal approach of safety analysis has gradually drawn the attention of researchers in industry and academia [5] - [7] . The flight control system of France's Dassault Falcon 7x aircraft acquired airworthiness certification using the data flow language AltaRica to describe the system model [6] . The unpublished ARP4761 revision may be added to the terms of use of model-based safety analysis [8] . (ARP4761, Guidelines and Methods for Conducting the Safety Assessment Procedure on Civil Airborne Systems and Equipment is a standard (a Recommended Practice) from the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE).) Based on a unified formalized system and fault model, which makes the system development and safety analysis closely linked, and by automating the creation of ancillary tools for traditional safety analysis methods such as fault trees, model-based safety analysis reduces the amount of labor that is involved and improves the accuracy, completeness and reusability of safety analysis [4] , [8] . Based on the above ideas, aiming at the problems with the existing methods for fault-tree generation, this paper proposes a novel approach to automatically generating fault trees using software product line model checking.
Model checking [9] is an automatic formal verification technique for determining the correctness of a computing system behavior. The basic idea is to use the state transition system S to represent the behavior of a system and a modal logic or a temporal logic formula ϕ to describe an attribute of the system. In this way, this sentence ''whether the system has the desired properties'' can be translated into the mathematical question ''whether the state transition system S is a model that satisfies the formula ϕ,'' which is formulated as S | ϕ. For finite state systems, the problem is decidable, which means that a computer program can be used to exhaustively search the state space of the model in a limited time to determine whether ϕ is satisfied or not in S. If it is satisfied, the correctness of the system is verified; otherwise, there is an error in the system and the correctness of the system is unverified.
The software product line is a collection of softwareintensive systems that are developed on the basis of public core resources in the prescribed manner. These systems share a common set of functions that can be managed to meet specific market or mission needs [10] . In practice, the software product line can be described by ''features'' since a product line can be regarded as a collection of features with hierarchical relationships. These features refer to the aspects, qualities or characteristics of a software system itself or internal functions that are visible to the user, significant or distinctive [11] . Between products in the same software product line, there are parts that are the same or similar, and parts that are different. Variability is used to describe the differences between products in the product line, which is an important characteristic in software product line engineering [12] . Products in a software product line can be considered as a collection of features, and software product line model checking refers to finding a product that meets a product requirement based on a product line model [13] .
Existing safety analysis techniques usually describe the origin, propagation or concrete behavior of a fault, but do not describe the constraint relationships between faults. There are a variety of constraints between failures, such as dependencies (for example, a battery failure will lead to failure of the supported components) and mutually exclusive relationships (for example, it is impossible for the two states of a switch, namely, stuckOn and stuckOff, to appear at the same time). The constraints are characteristics of the system. Therefore, the main benefit of describing these constraints on the system failure is that we can model the system faults more realistically and more accurately.
In this paper, the variability modeling of a software product line is introduced into the procedure for safety analysis, and the feature model is used as the structural model of system failure to depict the fault hierarchy and the constraint relationships. At the same time, a Fault-Labeled Transition System (FLTS) is proposed through the expansion of the state transition system and used as a system failure behavior model. Then, based on the semantics of FLTS, the procedure of generating a fault tree using model checking is defined. Finally, an existing software product line model-checking tool, namely, SNIP [14] , [15] , is used to implement the fault tree generation procedure based on the system model.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows: 1) By introducing the management of variability in the software product line into the procedure of safety analysis, a failure in the system is taken as a feature that can be configured in the system, thereby providing an intuitive and understandable perspective from which the safety analysis can describe the structural and behavioral characteristics of the system.
2) A system fault configuration modeling method that is based on state transition automata is defined, which can explicitly describe and represent the constraint relationships between system faults and the system behavior under various system fault configurations.
3) According to the semantics of FLTS, a model checking procedure for generating fault trees is designed; it is based on the system model and aims to utilize specific safety attributes. 4) Using a mature software product line model-checking tool, namely, SNIP, a procedure for generating fault trees based on the system model for specific safety attributes is established, and the software system is implemented; the experiments show that the feasibility of this method can be verified.
In general, software product line model checking technique is applied to safety analysis of complex systems in this paper. Since system safety analysis aims at studying system behavior under different failure scenarios, this paper considers a component failure as a configurable feature and analyze system behavior under various fault combinations via software product line model checking. While traditional model checking can only detect system behavior under a specific system fault configuration, by using feature models to represent constraints over faults, product line model checking enables safety analysis of multiple fault configurations simultaneously using model checking tool SNIP, which significantly improves the efficiency of safety analysis. Section 2 begins with an overview of the related background knowledge, including fault trees and linear-time temporal logic (LTL) [16] . FLTS is introduced in section 3 and FLTS-based semantics is introduced in section 4. Section 5 discusses how to describe fault behavior using the modeling language of the SNIP model checking tool. Section 6 presents experimental results and analysis with specific examples. Section 7 discusses the related work on model-based safety analysis. Finally, we summarize this paper's work and discuss the next research direction.
II. PRELIMINARIES
This section introduces the related preparatory knowledge, including the basic concepts of fault trees and temporal logic.
A. FAULT TREE
A fault tree is a tree-like logic diagram in which fault events, logic gates and other symbols describe the logical relationships between the various events in the system. It depicts the reasons for system failure. Fault events include system hardware, software and human error events. Logic gates describe the logical relationships between fault events. A fault tree consists of the following parts:
1) Top-Level Event (TLE): It represents a failure of the system and is expressed as the root node of the fault tree.
2) Bottom event (basic event): It represents a basic fault of a system component and is represented as a leaf node of the fault tree.
3) Intermediate event: It represents a failure event that is not completely decomposed and is expressed as an intermediate node in the fault tree. 4) Logic gate: It is a logical symbol that describes the causal relationship between events. Examples include ''AND gate,'' ''OR gate,'' and ''Voting door.'' Fault tree common symbols and their meanings can be found in the literature [2] . Data acquisition systems are one of the most representative examples of model-based safety analysis [17] , [18] . As shown in Figure 1 , a data acquisition system includes three modules: a monitor, a sensor and a filter. Both the sensor module and the filter module contain two work units, which correspond to the Primary Mode and the Backup Mode. The data acquisition system workflow is as follows: the sensor module collects data, and the data are sent to the filter and the monitoring unit. The filter module receives the data from the sensor module, and the data are processed and sent to the monitoring unit; at the same time, the data are output by the data acquisition system. The monitoring unit receives the data of the sensor module and the filter module and uses the data to determine whether the sensor module and the filter module have failed. If a module has failed, then the module with a fault will switch from the primary mode to the backup mode, while activating an alarm. Figure 2 shows an example of a fault tree that is output by the data acquisition system, where OutputError is the toplevel event, which indicates the system's output error, and SensorError and FilterError are two basic events that indicate sensor module error and filter module error, respectively, and are connected to the top-level event through an OR gate, both of which can independently cause the top-level event to occur.
A Cut Set (CS) is a collection of basic events in the fault tree. When basic events in a cut set occur simultaneously, the top-level event is likely to occur. For a cut set, if the toplevel event does not occur when either of the bottom events in a cut set does not occur, then such a cut set is called a Minimal Cut Set (MCS). Therefore, the minimal cut sets represent the most fundamental combinations of basic fault events that lead to system failures. Any one fault tree can be represented in a simplified two-level structure, with the bottom level representing all the minimum cut sets that are connected to the top-level fault event via an OR gate. Taking the fault tree in Figure 2 as an example, the cut sets are {SensorError}, {FilterError} and {SensorError, FilterError}, and the minimum cut sets are {SensorError} and {FilterError}.
B. LINEAR TEMPORAL LOGIC
In this paper, we study fault tree generation based on model checking and the safety attributes are described by linear temporal logic. The following is a brief introduction to linear temporal logic.
Definition 1: The syntax for Linear Timing Logic (LTL) is given by the Bakus Naur paradigm as follows: The LTL formula can be transformed into a Büchi Automaton (BA) [19] .
Definition 2: A Büchi Automaton (BA) is a 5-tuple (Q, , δ, Q 0 , F), where Q is a set of states, is a symbol table, δ ⊆ Q× ×Q represents the transition system, Q 0 ⊆ Q represents the initial state set, and F ⊆ Q is the set of accepted states. A Büchi Automaton accepts the infinite words that have unlimited access to the accepted state.
III. FAULT MODEL OF THE SYSTEM
To study the model-based fault tree generation method and express our ideas more clearly, we propose a Fault Feature Diagram (FFD) for describing fault-constraint relationships, which is new model, and a Fault-Labeled Transition System (FLTS) for describing models with normal behavior and fault behavior of a system.
A. FAULT FEATURE DIAGRAM
In complex systems, there are many types of faults and there are constraint relationships between failures, such as dependency and mutual exclusion [20] . For example, a switch may encounter the Stuck-At Fault. It is also possible for a switch to remain permanently closed or open. However, the two failure conditions do not appear at the same time in the system.
To ensure the accuracy of fault tree analysis, we must consider the constraints between faults. For this reason, we propose a new concept, which is named ''Fault Feature Diagram,'' as a model for describing the constraint relationships between faults. This concept is our basic starting point. It is a feature modeling method that is based on the software product line and provides a new approach to the automated generation of fault trees.
Definition 3: The Fault Feature Diagram (FFD) is a treelike feature model that is based on the fault feature set F in the form of a graph. Each edge of the tree represents a feature constraint. Feature constraints are divided into four types, namely, OR, Optional, Alternative and Mandatory (mandatory), which are expressed by the following formulas:
where p, f and f i (i ≤ i ≤ n) are the elements in the feature set F.
We use the data acquisition system in Figure 1 to illustrate the FFD. The original data acquisition system is expanded as necessary and a variety of faults may occur in a single component, which is not possible in the existing automatic fault tree generation methods. The following faults of data acquisition system components may occur:
1) The sensor unit may have a fault that deviates from the normal law of change, which is named drift. For example, under normal circumstances, the initial value of the sensor unit for collecting data is 1, the data value is increased by 1 each time data are collected, and reset to 1 when the data value reaches 5. If a drift has occurred, the data value is increased by 2 each time and is not reset. The fault is a transient fault, which means that the fault may return to normal.
2) The sensor unit may also have a stuck-at fault, which is also called a ''Permanent Fault.'' When the sensor is paralyzed, the collected data will remain constant. Once this fault occurs, its effect is permanent; the components cannot be restored to normal.
3) The filter unit may have a stuck-at fault, similar to the sensor unit, and the data of the filter unit will remain at fixed values, which is a permanent failure. The fault feature diagram of the data acquisition system is shown in Figure 3 . The fault feature diagram is a tree-like diagram. Each node in the graph represents a fault feature. The root node represents the fault of the data acquisition system, the leaf node represents the basic fault of the system element, and the intermediate node represents the fault of the system module. The edges of the fault feature diagram depict the constraint relationships between the fault features; as shown in the example, there are ''AND'' relations, ''OR'' relations, etc. As shown in Figure 3 , features S1 and S2 are connected by an AND relationship to feature SS, which indicates that failure of the sensor module includes failures of the primary sensor unit and the backup sensor unit. Feature S1DT and feature S1SP indicate that failure of the primary sensor may occur, both of which are marked as optional and connected VOLUME 6, 2018 with the ''AND'' relation. This relationship expresses that the two features do not affect each other in the system operation. Therefore, three cases are possible: both features occur, one of them occurs or neither occur. Features S2DT and S2SP are also optional failures; the difference from the previous features is that the two features are connected to feature S2 by the XOR relation, which indicates that the two types of faults of the backup sensor unit do not occur simultaneously in one operation of the system.
Existing safety analysis techniques usually describe the origin, propagation or concrete behavior of a fault without modeling the constraint relationships between faults. As mentioned earlier, these constraints are inherent characteristics of the system. Hence, we must describe them to make the modeling of the system faults more realistic and accurate. According to the meanings of the nodes and edges in the figure, the fault feature map describes the constraint relationships of fault features. A set of fault features that satisfy the constraints of the fault pattern is called a Fault Configuration of the system. Definition 4: Let ffd be a systematic fault feature model and F be the set of all fault features. If there is a set of features fc ⊆ F that satisfy the constraints between the characteristics of ffd, then fc is a Fault Configuration of the system. Then, the semantics of the fault feature diagram is a set of all valid system fault configurations, which is denoted as [ }. Consider the data acquisition system that is shown in Figure 3 as an example. According to the semantics of the fault feature diagram, the fault set of the data acquisition system is fault = {S1SP, S1DT, S2SP, S2DT, F1SP, F2SP}, and the complete system fault configuration set is {2 fault }.
B. FAULT-LABELED TRANSITION SYSTEM
The traditional model checking procedure usually uses the state transition system to model the system behavior. The Kripke structure [21] is a commonly used system model that includes the system state and the relationships of the system state transition. To analyze the behavior of a system with fault features, this paper extends the Kripke structure by proposing the Feature-Labeled Transition System (FLTS), which is used to distinguish the behavior of the transition relationship description by adding a signature to the transition relationship. The fault-labeled transition system is formally defined as follows: Definition 5: An FLTS is a tuple flts = {S, I, P, R, L, ffd, γ }, where: 1) S is a set of finite states; 2) I ⊆ S is a set of initial states; 3) P is a set of atomic propositions; 4) R ⊆ S × S is a set of transition relationships; 5) L : S → 2 P is a label function; 6) ffd is a model of fault features; 7) γ : R → ({⊥, } |N| → {⊥, }) is a full function that marks each transition with a fault feature expression.
Transition relation R is a full mapping, that is, for each state s, there is a successor state s , which is denoted as R(s, s ). The label function L labels each state with a set of atomic propositions that are all true in that state. The FLTS contains a fault feature diagram ffd that describes the constraints between faults and specifies a valid system fault configuration set. The fault label function γ labels a fault feature expression f for each transition (s, s ) ∈ R, where f expresses that when the system fault combination occurs, the system will migrate from the current state s to the successor state s . The fault combination f = a ∧ b indicates that changing the system state requires faults a and b to occur at the same time; the fault combination f = a ∨ b indicates that if fault a or b occurs, the system state may trigger the state migration; the fault combination f = ¬a ∧ b expresses when the fault a does not occur and the fault b occurs, the system triggers the state migration. Different faults can lead to different system behaviors. Taking the data acquisition system in Example 1 as an example, the three Kripke structures in Figure 4 depict the normal system behaviors and the two fault behaviors. To facilitate understanding, the transition is labeled to indicate the meaning of the migration, e.g., for the sensor module to collect data or send data to the filter module; the Kripke structure does not include these labels. Figure 4a shows the normal behavior of the system. State 0 represents the initial state of the system. The transition from state 0 to state 1 describes the procedure of collecting data by the sensor module. The transition from state 1 to state 2 represents the sensor module sending data to the filter module. The transition from state 2 to state 3 represents the sensor module sending data to the monitoring module. The transition from state 3 to state 4 expresses that the filter module will send the processed data to the monitoring module. The transition from state 4 to state 5 indicates that the data that are processed by the sensor module will serve as the system output. Finally, the system will return to re-acquire data. Figure 4b shows the system behavior when a permanent failure occurs on a primary sensor unit. When the sensor module collects data, it collects the wrong data due to the permanent-type faults of the primary sensor unit. The subsequent system behavior is the same as that of the normal system. However, when the monitoring module finds that the data of the sensor module is incorrect, the system no longer directly returns to the initial state to collect the data again. Instead, an alarm is sent first. Then, the monitoring module sends a switching instruction to the sensor module to switch the sensor module to the backup unit and the system reacquires the data. This process is described by the transitions from state 5 to state 6 and state 6 to state 0 in Figure 4b . Figure 4c depicts the behavior of the primary sensor unit in the event of a transient deviation from the fault. First, the sensor module may collect both normal data and data that deviate during data acquisition. Therefore, there are two migration relationships between state 0 and state 1, which represent the two behaviors. When the data that are collected by the sensor module are normal data or the deviation of the data does not exceed the normal data value range, the system behavior is consistent with that of the normal system. If the data that are collected by the sensor module are outside the normal range, the subsequent system behavior is the same as in Figure 4b . Figure 5 uses the Kripke structure to describe the behavior of a system that contains both of these faults. However, it cannot be determined from the figure whether the migration relationship indicates normal system behavior or faulty system behavior. Adding feature tags to the system model can effectively depict the effects of faults on system behavior and FLTS visually depicts the impact of all features on system behavior in a single graph. Figure 6 is a fault-labeled transition system of a data acquisition system that includes two fault features of a primary sensor unit. Migration without fault features in the figure indicates normal system behavior, such as the transition from state 2 to state 3. The migration feature tag for state 5 to state 6 is S1SP ∨ S1DT, which expresses that both faults of the sensor unit can cause the migration to occur, and the migration relationship constitutes a fault behavior.
The fault-labeled transition system can be regarded as an aggregation of Kripke structures that describe the system behavior under various fault configurations. As a parametric model, it can be instantiated into various behavioral models according to the associated fault configurations, which each describe the system behavior under a specific fault configuration.
The procedure of instantiating a behavioral model with a specific fault configuration from an FLTS can be defined using FLTS projection operations. To obtain the system behavior for a fault configuration, a projection of the FLTS must be associated with a set of fault features, which is denoted as fc ⊆ [[ffd]] FFD . From a grammatical point of view, the projection operation removes transitions whose fault labels do not belong to fc. The result of the projection operation is a normal Kripke structure.
Definition 6 For an FLTS model flts = {S, I, P, R, L, ffd, γ } and a fault configuration fc ⊆ [[ffd]] FFD , the projection flts to fc is a Kripke structure M = {S, I, P, R , L}, where R = {t ∈ R|fc ∈ γ (t)}; this projection is denoted as flts| fc .
FLTS: As in Figure 6 , if we want to obtain a projection of the fault configuration fc = {S1DT}, it is necessary to delete the fault feature S1SP and its associated migration. First, we find the signature that contains the migration in the figure. If a fault advisor is removed, the migration's stimulus is absent; hence, the migration is deleted. Migration and fault flags are set as follows: Excitation conditions are still satisfied after the fault feature is removed; thus, the migration VOLUME 6, 2018 relationship is preserved. Finally, the fault feature is removed and the projection is consistent with the Kripke structure that is shown in Figure 4c . According to the example, a faultlabeled transition system describes all its projection behavior. Therefore, the semantics of FLTS is a combination of all its projections.
First, find the migration that contains the feature label S1SP; they are 0 S1SP − −− → 1, 5 → 6, and 6 → 0 in figure 6 . If the fault feature S1SP is removed from the transition 0 S1SP − −− → 1, the migration stimulus condition is no longer satisfied; hence, the migration can be deleted from the FLTS. However, the fault labels of transitions 5 → 6 and 6 → 0 are S1SP ∨ S1DT and the triggering condition is still satisfied after the fault feature S1SPis deleted; thus, the transition relationship is preserved. Finally, after the fault feature S1DT is removed, the projection is consistent with the Kripke structure that is shown in Figure 4c . According to the example, a fault-labeled transition system describes all its projection behavior; thus, the semantics of FLTS is a combination of all its projections. This characteristic can be represented as indicated in definition 7.
The traditional safety analysis usually has a fault space that is too large. This paper describes the constraint relationships between component failures using a feature diagram, which also describes the connections between the failure and the components. The feature diagram provides a clear perspective on the fault configuration and intuitively reflects the domain knowledge of the safety engineer. In addition, it helps reduce the size of the fault space and provide an important basis for selecting a legal fault combination for safety analysis. FLTS links the normal behavior, fault behavior and system features, and describes all the system behaviors of the faulty configuration that the FFD represents that satisfy the constraint relationship.
IV. GENERATION OF THE FAULT TREE OF FTLS
In the previous section, we defined the fault feature diagram and the fault-labeled transition system and explained these concepts with examples. Then, we defined the projection operation of the fault-labeled transition system. On this basis, this section will demonstrate the procedure for generating a fault tree through model checking for the safety attributes, which are described by linear temporal logic.
Fault tree generation is essentially the discovery of all fault combinations that can cause the top-level event to occur and the software product line model checking method can find all products that do not satisfy the needs of the product. The two methods are consistent. Therefore, this paper describes the system safety attributes using LTL and uses the software product line model checking method to analyze FTLS and generate a fault tree for specific safety attributes. The inputs of a model checking procedure include a fault-labeled transition system and a system safety attribute. In this paper, the essential step in generating a fault tree using model checking to analyze an FLTS is to calculate all cut sets according to the FLTS for specific safety attributes and obtain the minimum cut set via minimization.
For LTL formulas and FLTS models, we can use automaton-based approaches for model checking. Suppose flts is a system model and ϕ is a safety property that is represented by the LTL formula. First, the safety attribute ϕ is inverted and transformed into a Büchi automaton BA(¬ϕ). Then, flts and BA(¬ϕ) are composed to obtain an extended FLTS via the composition operation.
Definition 8: For a fault-labeled transition system flts = {S, I, P, R, L, ffd, γ } and a BA, a = (Q, 2 P , δ, Q 0 , F), the result of composition operation flts ⊗ a is still an FLTS, that is, flts = {S × Q, I , P , R , L , ffd, γ }, where: 1) P = Q and L (s, q) = q, which are the state labels of flts , are the states of BA; 2) (s, q) → (t, p) iif s → t and q → p;
F in Büchi automaton a is an accepted state that is contrary to the state of the safety attributes [20] . The flags on the state in flts are the states in a; hence, the acceptance state in flts is those states that are marked as accepted in F. The accepted states of flts are the set of system fault states that correspond to the top-level event, that is, TLE = {s ∈ S × Q|L (s) ∈ F}. Because flts is still an FLTS, its semantics are still all the paths that it represents: [[flts ]] FLTS . The problem of verifying that flts violates the safety attribute ϕ translates into the determining the existence of an acceptable execution path on the expanded FLTS flts . For an ''unsafe'' state s, this is equivalent to determining whether it can be accessed indefinitely in flts , where s ∈ TLE. If no such path exists, the system satisfies the safety attributes; otherwise, the system does not satisfy the safety attributes, and the set of all fault features on the path is a cut set. Taking a data acquisition system as an example, suppose the top-level event is ''the sensor module fails'' and the LTL formula is expressed as <> value ≥ 15. As shown in Figure 6 , state 6 is the fault state that corresponds to the top-level event. Starting from the initial state, first, the data collector module acquires the wrong data after being migrated 0 S1SP − −− → 1. Then, the system output is incorrect after being migrated 1 → . . . →5. The system sends an alert, which transits to state 6 by 5 S1SP − −− → 6. Therefore, there is a path 0 S1SP − −− → 1→ . . . → 5 S1SP − −− → 6 that reaches the fault state in the system. This path contains the fault feature S1SP; hence, {S1SP} is the cut set that caused the top-level event to occur. Based on the above observation, cut sets in FTLS are formally defined as follows:
Definition 9: Let flts = {S, I, P, R, L, ffd, γ } be a system, where ffd is a fault feature model and F is the set of all fault features. Suppose fc ⊆ F is a fault configuration. If there exists a path π = s 0 s 1 , . . . , s k in flts| fc , where s k ∈ TLE, we call fc a cut set of TLE, which is written as cs(FC, TLE).
A cut set of the system's fault tree represents a possible failure of the system, that is, a failure mode. Because the top-level event is inevitable when the minimum cut set occurs, all the minimal cut sets of a fault tree represent all the possibilities of the top-level event, that is, all the failure modes of the system. The minimum cut set indicates the basic faults that must be repaired of a system that is in a state of fault and shows the weakest link of the system. By isolating a fault of a cut set in the system design to prevent these faults from occurring at the same time, the safety of a system can be improved. The minimum cut set is formally defined as follows:
Definition 10: Let F be the set of all fault features. Let FC = 2 F be the set of all fault configurations and TLE be the fault state set of a system. The cut set and minimum cut set are expressed as follows:
Based on the various definitions of ''minimization,'' the concept of the minimum cut set can be extended to the more-extensive prime implication set [23] . The latter includes not only the faults that occurred but also the faults that do not occur.
Based on the above procedure, given an FLTS flts and an LTL formula ϕ, which represents the safety attribute, the procedure for generating a fault tree using model checking can be summarized as follows:
1) Obtain the extended FLTS flts = fts ⊗ BA(¬ϕ), where
2) Find all the paths from the initial state to TLE and obtain all the cut sets CS(TLE) of the top-level event;
3) Through the minimization of CS(TLE), all the minimum cut sets MCS(TLE) are obtained. The procedure is described in [24] ; 4) Organize the smallest cut set into a tree-like structure according to the symbolic definition of the fault tree.
The fault tree portrays all fault combinations that lead to top-level events and the software product line model checking method can find the products that satisfy all product requirements. This article takes advantage of both characteristics and applies software product line model checking to the generation of fault trees. In this section, based on the definition of FLTS, the LTL is used to describe the system safety attributes, and cut sets and minimum cut sets are formally defined. Then, the procedure for obtaining the cut sets and the minimal cut sets using model checking based on automata is discussed and summarized. The next section will describe the existing model checking tool SNIP [14] , [15] and how SNIP can be used to model system failure behavior.
V. MODELING THE SYSTEM
This paper implements the fault tree analysis that is described in Section 4 on the basis of SNIP. This section briefly discusses how to describe FLTS in the language of SNIP.
The FLTS and feature diagram are semantic models. To model the actual system, a high-level modeling language is needed. SNIP is a model checking tool that was developed by A. Classen and others for software product lines. The traditional model checking tools can only check the system behavior under the specific system fault configuration, while SNIP can analyze the system behavior under multiple fault configurations at the same time. SNIP has implemented a model checking procedure for software product lines. Given a product line model and product requirements, if all products meet the product requirements, the checking result is True; otherwise, SNIP can find all products that do not meet the product requirements. SNIP also uses a feature diagram model to model software product lines; hence SNIP's checking results are product feature sets. SNIP relies on two advanced modeling languages: Textual Variability Language (TVL) [25] and fPromela [14] . TVL is used to describe the variability configuration, namely, the fault feature model, and fPromela is used to describe the system's normal and fault behaviors.
A. FAULT FEATURE MODEL
TVL is a text-based feature model description language that can effectively describe the constraints of fault features and has good readability. In addition, TVL has strict semantic support for formal analysis. The fault feature model that is shown in Figure 3 in Section 2 uses the TVL language description, as shown in Table 1 . In Table 1 , the fault feature model begins with the declaration of the root feature (line 1). The root feature ''Acquisition'' is decomposed into three sub-features: ''Monitor,'' ''Sensors'' and ''Filters''; the data acquisition system includes these three modules. The decomposition of the features is guided by the keyword ''group,'' followed by the type of decomposition. The ''and,'' ''or'' and ''xor'' decomposition types in the failure feature model are represented by ''allof,'' ''someof'' and ''one of.'' These keywords can also be represented in terms of cardinality, such as ''[ * .. * ]'' on line 3 and ''[1..1]'' on line 14, and they are equivalent to ''allof.'' Commas that are separated by curly braces indicates a series of sub-features after decomposition. If a feature is optional, it can be represented by the ''opt'' keyword.
B. MODEL OF FAULT BEHAVIOR
The fPromela language is a formal descriptive language that is used to model finite-state systems to describe system behavior. The core data structure of fPromela is the ''process'' in the system design procedure. The process is often used to model a component of the system. The syntax of the fPromela language is very similar to that of the widely used model-checking tool SPIN [26] in Promela, thereby allowing parallel processes to be created simultaneously. These processes can communicate synchronously and asynchronously with each other through message channels. Unlike Promela, fPromela adds feature elements as labels that indicate the impact of features on system behavior. The fPromela code corresponds semantically to the Feature Transition System (FTS) [15] . In this paper, FLTS considers a fault as a configurable feature and analyzes the effect of the fault on system behavior from the perspective of product line configuration. Thus, FLTS and the feature transition system are semantically equivalent. Therefore, this paper uses the fPromela language for FLTS modeling and SNIP for model checking.
In general, safety analysis divides faults into Permanent Faults and Transient Faults. The former indicates that the component fails to recover in the event of a failure, while the latter indicates that the component is recoverable and may fail again [27] . For example, a short-circuit fault that is caused by a short-time hurricane in a power system due to strong winds is an instantaneous fault, while failures of devices to operate due to component structural damage are permanent faults.
A fault is a component's property, whereas the occurrence of a fault is a component's dynamic behavior. The fault is activated under a trigger condition and affects the system behavior and status. Therefore, modeling the fault requires the trigger condition of fault and the impact of the fault to be described. Accordingly, to describe the fault behavior in the system model, we add a fault control variable for each fault to control whether fault behavior occurs. At the same time, we add a state variable to the component and used it to indicate whether the component is currently in a normal state or a fault state. The fPromela snippets that describe the two fault types are shown in Table 2 and Table 3 , and the two ways of describing fault behavior can be viewed as patterns that describe two common fault categories. This mode can help reduce the difficulty of fault behavior description and help automate the modeling process.
Line 1 in Table 2 instantiates a feature variable. Line 2 uses the key word ''proctype'' to define a process that describes the behavior of a component. The variable fault_permanent_control is used to control the occurrence of fault behavior, and the variable component_state is used to indicate the current state of the component. Lines 5-9 indicate that a fault may occur at any time when the component is working normally. Lines 10-13 indicate that if the system has a fault feature, the system components enter faulty status. Lines [15] [16] indicate that this is a permanent failure and that the component will not be able to recover once it has failed. The variable component_state is an integer or enumeration variable whose value depends on the fault. The procedure for describing transient faults in Table 3 is the same overall as that for describing permanent faults, except that it is still possible for the component to return to normal after it has failed (lines [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] .
VI. EXPERIMENTS AND ANALYSIS
This section mainly uses the data acquisition system that is mentioned in Section 2.1 as an example to present the results of the fault tree generation process that is proposed in this paper.
A. EXPERIMENTAL ENVIRONMENT
In this paper, the model-checking tool SNIP is used to analyze the data acquisition system in Section 2.1, calculate the minimum cut set for a particular safety attribute, and generate a fault tree. The operating platform includes an Intel i5 M480 2.67 GHz CPU + 4GB RAM + deepin2014.3.
B. EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE AND ANALYSIS
The input of the SNIP model checking tool consists of three parts: the fault feature diagram model, the fault behavior model and the system safety attributes. The data acquisition system fault feature diagram model is shown in Table 1 .
Taking the primary sensor unit in the data acquisition system as an example, Table 4 lists the fPromela models that describe two types of fault behavior using the fault description mode that was introduced in Section 5.2. The variable sensor_state in line 1 is used to indicate the current state of sensors: 1 indicates normal status, 2 indicates ''drift'' fault status and 3 indicates ''stuck'' fault status. The two variables, namely, drift_control and stuck_contorl, in lines 2 and 3, respectively, are used to control the occurrence of both faults. The ''mode'' variable in line 4 indicates that the sensor unit is in primary or backup mode. CMode in line 5 is a channel variable. The monitor module sends the mode information to the sensor unit through the channel and determines whether the current mode is the primary mode. If not, the subsequent actions are not executed. Lines 6-17 indicate that if the system includes the S1_drift_transient fault feature, the system may experience a drift or recovery failure if no permanent stuck fault occurs in the system. If a stuck fault has occurred, it will be permanently in the state of stuck failure. Lines 19-30 describe the effect of the S1_stuck_permanent fault feature on the system behavior. When stuck faults do not occur, they do not affect the behavior of the system. The system may still operate normally or a drift fault may occur. However, when a stuck fault occurs, it will overwrite the drift fault and the system will be permanently in stuck fault status. Lines 33-40 indicate that the sensor unit performs different system behaviors in different statuses.
System safety attributes are entered as LTL formulas. This paper verifies the following four safety attributes for the data acquisition system: SNIP is used to validate the data acquisition system model, and the minimum cut set for the above safety attributes is obtained. The results are shown in Table 5 . In Table 5 , if formula (#2) is falsified, there is a corresponding top-level event that is ''the primary sensor unit is fail.'' Figure 6 shows the FLTS that contains two fault features of the primary sensor unit, where state 6 is the fault status that corresponds to the top-level event that is represented by Formula (#1). From − −−−−−− → 6. Thus, the corresponding cut set of the top-level event is {S1DT}, {S1SP} and {S1SP, S1DT}, and the minimum cut set is {S1DT} and {S1SP}. Figure 7 is the fault tree of the top-level event that is expressed by formula (#1). Id formula (#3) is falsified, the corresponding top-level event is ''the sensor unit failed twice,'' that is, after the primary sensor unit failed, the backup sensor unit also failed. The backup sensor's FLTS is similar to the primary sensor units, except that the fault features change from S1SP and S1DT to 2SP and S2DT , respectively. Therefore, the top-level event can be understood as the failure of the primary sensor unit to bring the system from the initial state to state 6. Then, the system reaches state 6 again after switching the sensor unit to the backup unit. The procedure by which the system first arrives at state 6 from the initial state is the same as the top-level event that is represented by formula (#1) and the paths of the system in reaching state 6 again are 0 Table 5 , and the fault tree is shown in Figure 8 .
From the experimental results, the fault is regarded as a configurable feature. The fault feature diagram is used to depict the fault feature constraint relationship and the FLTS is used to describe the system and fault behaviors. It is feasible to use the software product line model checking method to generate the fault tree by solving for the minimum cut set. Based on the accurate semantic of model and automated statespace search using model checking, the accuracy of fault tree generation is improved, and the workload is reduced.
C. TIME PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
This paper analyzes the safety attribute ''sensor unit does not fail.'' The results of the safety analysis are shown in Table 6 , where the number I indicates that software product line model checking is applied, but the feature model is not used to optimize the fault space, and the number II indicates the experimental data that use features to describe the constraint relationships. The data acquisition system contains 6 fault features. Hence, a total of 2 6 fault combinations are included before the system feature model is built. The number of legal fault combinations is reduced to 48 after the fault constraint model for describing the fault constraint relationships is established. For the safety attribute ''sensor unit does not fail,'' this paper and the model checking method that does not use the feature model find the same two minimum cut sets that can cause the system to fail. Therefore, the experiment proves that it is feasible to regard the component failure as the configurable feature and associate the software product line model checking method with safety analysis.
To analyze the influence of fault injection and fault type on the system size and the performance of the fault tree generation process, various systems are obtained by changing the fault types based on the prototype data acquisition system, as shown in Table 7 . The time and memory that are used by each system state space and state space search process are listed in Table 8 . The number of system states in Table 8 indicates the size of the system state space. The number of search states is the actual number of system states that are visited during the search process. This is because in the procedure of model checking, all paths that can cause the top-level event occur, and some states are repeatedly visited. According to the data in the table, injecting fault features into the system will have a significant impact on the state space of the system, which will increase the time and memory that are required to search all the execution paths and the impact of transient faults will be greater.
VII. RELATED WORK
Model checking is an automatic formal verification technique that is used to determine the correct behavioral properties of a finite-state computer system. Currently, model checking is widely used in system analysis and verification of computer hardware, control systems, communication protocols, and security authentication protocols. Commonly used model detectors include SPIN, NuSMV, and Z3. Software product line model checking is more complex than the model checking of a single system. In the model checking of the software product line, it is necessary to determine the correct behavior attribute of each product on the software product line.
Nowadays, with the increase of users' demands, the software product line grows in size, which makes formal verification of the software product line gradually attract attention. In [54] , Larsen et al. proposed a behavior modeling based on I/O automaton to verify the error of the binding interface. However, this method does not consider verification of the behavior of the software product line behavior. The problem of model checking on software product line is different from the model checking of a single software system. Since the software product line contains hundreds or even thousands of products, implementing the model checking on the software product line level is one of the main methods for the software product line model checking problem. Gruler et al. [55] extended the process algebra CCS and proposed PL-CCS to support the exclusive or relationship between two processes in the software product line. However, they did not verify their effectiveness through relevant experiments. The model checking method proposed by Asirellis et al. [56] , Beek et al. [57] used Modal Transition Systems(MTS) to describe the system behavior, used MHML logic to describe the system attributes and the constraint relationships that need to be added when the product model is obtained. They developed the tool VMC to conduct model checking MHML formula on MTS. Fei He et al. proposed an efficient model-checking technique for SPLs using induction and a SAT (Boolean satisfiability problem) solver [58] .
Most studies are based on Modal Transition Systems (MTSs). In an MTS, all the system behaviors are described by transitions. The types of transition are divided into mandatory and optional. This method achieves the description of the commonalities and the variability of software product lines but ignores the impact of the features of software product lines on the system behavior; hence, the model checking results lack the connections between product attributes and a single feature or a combination of multiple features. This prevents developers from discovering products that do not satisfy the attributes through model checking. Thus, Classen et al. developed a model checking tool for software product lines, which is called SNIP, that can find all products that do not meet product requirements. We apply software product line model checking to fault tree analysis techniques.
The fault tree is an important part of safety analysis. In recent years, research work that is related to fault trees has mainly focused on two directions: fault tree analysis and fault tree generation. In the analysis of fault trees, reference [28] proposed that a fault tree can be stored as a binary decision diagram, and the minimum cut set and prime implication set of the fault tree should be calculated using the binary decision diagram. In this way, the storage space of the fault tree is substantially reduced and the efficiency of the fault tree analysis is improved. However, the efficiency of this method still needs to be improved due to the sorting problem of the fault tree bottom-level events. Joanne Bechta Dugan and Salvatore J. proposed a dynamic fault tree that is based on an extension of the traditional fault tree to overcome the problem that the traditional fault tree cannot describe the temporal relationships of fault events and developed a dynamic fault tree modeling and analysis tool, which was named Galileo [30] . Its main characteristics are the addition of dynamic logic gates, the introduction of dynamic logic, and the ability to more accurately describe the priority and temporal relationships between failure events. However, due to the difficulty of generating the correct dynamic fault tree and the high complexity due to its symbolic representation in the traditional artificial fault tree generation method, the dynamic fault tree has not been widely used in practical engineering. In [7] , Koh and Seong proposed a method that uses model checking to simplify and validate a safety attribute. The SMV language is used to establish the system model and the safety attributes are described by temporal logic. The redundant nodes and error nodes in the fault tree are deleted according to the results of model checking. Then, the correct fault tree is obtained. However, this method is still very cumbersome and due to the lack of user-friendly modeling methods, it has not been widely used in the field of traditional safety analysis. In [31] , a method of generating the minimum cut set of a fault tree using reverse Petri nets is proposed, which can effectively improve the efficiency of the solution. VOLUME 6, 2018 However, the procedure for constructing Petri nets is relatively complicated.
This article focuses on the generation of fault trees. In this regard, Aref Majdara and Toshio Wakabayashi proposed an automatic fault tree generation method that is based on component models in [30] and [31] . The approach decomposes the system into sets of components and sets of data flows between components; each component is described by a function table and a state transition table. Then, it generates a fault tree from a top-level fault event search through a backtracking search process. This method is simple, clear and easy to understand. Component models can be stored as component libraries to increase reusability. However, in this method, the abstraction of the system is too simple, as it ignores many important behaviors of the system in the safety analysis and is not suitable for analyzing large-scale complex systems.
As part of the EU's Research Projects Enhanced Safety Assessment for Complex Systems (ESACS) [6] and [34] Improvement of Safety Activities on Aeronautical Complex Systems (ISAAC), a research team that is led by Alessandro Cimatti and Marco Bozzano of the Bruno Kessler Research Center in Fondazione, Italy, has developed the FSAP / NuSMV-SA platform, which uses symbolic model checking for fault tree generation [35] , [36] . FSAP uses the NuSMV model-checking tool to generate the fault tree. For a given top-level event, by exhaustively searching the system state space that is described by the extended model, all minimum cut sets are extracted from the basic events that may lead to failure. Compared with manual fault tree analysis, this method can produce a more accurate and complete fault tree. The work of FSAP is similar to the work that is presented in this paper; however, this paper models the system from the standpoint of fault configuration. The main shortcoming of the FSAP method is that it provides models only for simple faults and does not support the description of the flexible component's external fault behavior.
The Hierarchically Performed Hazard Origin and Propagation Studies (HiP-HOPS) tool, which was developed by the Yiannis Papadopoulos team at the University of Holl in the UK [37] , [38] , is based on the analysis of component failure and its propagation modes to support safety assessment for complex systems from the system function level to the bottom component level. The main advantage of the HiP-HOPS tool is that the hierarchy of the system is clearly manifested in the fault tree and is easy to understand. However, its main problem is that it does not consider the behavior of the component during fault tree generation, thereby resulting in lack of dynamic information such as temporal dependencies between failures and fault paths.
Reference [39] used linear temporal logic to build the formal specifications for the fault tree, extracted the software safety attributes and described it with temporal logic to support model checking for safety-critical software. Reference [40] uses ontological descriptive language to build a fault tree domain ontology and uses a reasoning machine to solve the problem of repeated construction of fault trees without affecting system fault localization.
It is worth mentioning that the dramatic increase in complexity of computer systems has motivated a growing industrial interest in Model-based Safety Assessment (MBSA) methods [4] , [8] , [42] - [46] . Since MBSA methods are based on an integrated ''safety model'' of a system, those models need to be written in a suitable modeling language. Among those, there are two typical modeling languages: Architecture Analysis and Design Language (AADL) and AltaRica [45] , [49] , [50] . AADL is a multi-concerns modeling language designed specifically for distributed real-time embedded systems. And the AADL Error Model V2 (EMV2) [47] , [48] is an error annex focused on safety analyses. It supports modeling key features of failure/error propagations for the system architecture design and safety analysis. AltaRica is a high level modeling language dedicated to system safety analyses. It has a formal defined semantics, enabling the development of efficient assessment tools, such as compilers to Fault Trees and Markov chains, stochastic and stepwise simulators.
Most of the MBSA techniques support verification of functional correctness of system, and can assess system behaviors in the presence of faults with respect to functional safety requirements at the same time. In particular, formal verification tools based on model checking tool, e.g., NuSMV, have been extended to automate the generation of artifacts such as Fault Trees (FTs) and FMEA tables [17] , [51] - [53] .
Compared with the above model-based safety analysis and fault tree generation method, in this paper, the fault-treebased fault configuration method treats faults as manageable and configurable system features and imposes strict syntax and semantics. When modeling system faults and their behavior, the constraints between faults can be effectively described. In addition, the approach in this paper models system faults from a configuration perspective and can model and analyze multiple faults of a component at the same time.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Traditional safety analysis lacks effective solutions to the large scale and high complexity of safety-critical systems. Based on the concept of variability management in the product line method, this paper proposes an approach to modeling system faults and behavior and provides an algorithm for obtaining the minimum cut set for safety attributes through model checking. This approach differs from the traditional safety analysis methods; it uses existing model checking tools and improves the safety analysis efficiency.
In future work, we mainly intend to study the following aspects. 1) The paper mentions that the current algorithm has shortcomings in solving non-monotonic fault trees. Thus, it is necessary to improve the fault tree generation algorithm.
2) Using the current system model, only discrete system behavior can be described. The system behavior in continuous time will be studied in the future. 3) The current fault model uses Boolean logic, which can be extended to the fault tree analysis under multi-valued logic in the future. 4) Fault tree and state-space explosion is an important issue in model checking when verifying large-scale systems. Therefore, in the future, the abstract method of fault tree generation will be studied to improve the analysis efficiency [41] . In addition, we will further extend safety analysis from a single system to a configurable system product line. We will also study the extension of the fault tree to a dynamic fault tree while exploring automated modeling procedures. 
